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II. THE RENAISSANCE OF RAPE
III. THE SEXUAL ASSAULT COUNSELOR-VICTIM PRIVIEGE
IV. CONCLUSION
He must have patience who to law will go.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Over twenty-five years ago, a judicial call of duty thrust me into the
arena of alleviating the pain of victims from the brutality of sexual assault. I
chronicle here the birth and path of an unprecedented procedure, and urge
those jurisdictions who have not yet adopted it to take notice.2
* Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of California (retired). B.S., Boston University,
1956; J.D., Boston University School of Law, 1961; L.L.M., University of Southern California Law
Center, 1970.
1. FRANCIS MCNAMARA, 2000 FAMOUS LEGAL QUOTATIONS 156 (Aqueduct Books 1967).
2. In 1978, I published the first portion of this tale in Southwestern University Law Review.
Armand Arabian, The Cautionary Instruction in Sex Cases: A Lingering Insult, 10 Sw. U. L. REV.
585, 588-90 (1978). Out of a desire to tell the rest of the story, and to encourage those jurisdictions
who have not heeded that prior call to legislate in this arena, I reproduce it here with some changes
and additions. The untold part of the story begins at page nine. This article has benefited through
the years from the excellent research of student externs: Christopher M. Adishian and Michael
Murphy in 1993; Alyson Leichtner in 2002; Lori Brogin in 2004; and Sevana Zetlian in 2005.
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II. THE RENAISSANCE OF RAPE
In late 1973, as a Superior Court judge in Van Nuys, California I was
assigned a criminal case captioned People v. Leonardo Rincon-Pineda. The
defendant was charged with forcible rape, oral copulation, attempted
sodomy, and burglary. In his first trial, which had resulted in a mistrial, the
standard and mandatory cautionary jury instruction for rape cases had been
given by the trial judge:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case, is one
which is easily made, and once made, difficult to defend against,
even if the person accused is innocent . . . . Therefore the law
requires that you examine the testimony of the female person named
in the information with caution.4
This instruction had been in effect since 1856, when Chief Justice
Murray authored the opinion in People v. Benson.5 In that case, the trial
court found the defendant guilty of a rape on a thirteen year old girl, based
on her testimony.6 The California Supreme Court reversed the guilty
verdict, holding that both general evidence of reputation and specific
evidence of lewd acts with men other than the defendant were admissible to
cast doubt on the victim's claimed lack of consent.' The court went on to
3. There were two California Superior Court trials in this case. The case I was assigned and is
described here was the second case, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Van Nuys, No. A-
126773 (1973) (Arabian, J.) (on file with author). The two trials are described in the California
Superior Court opinion People v. Leonardo Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d. 864, 869-872 (1975).
4. Id. at 871. The opinion noted that, "The first trial court also read to the jury the text of
CAUIC No. 10.22, the cautionary instruction which though originally required only in cases
involving charges of forcible rape has since been held mandatory, sua sponte, in all sex offense
cases." Id. at 870-71. The opinion later stated that "we think the instruction as it has customarily
been worded (i.e., CALJIC No. 10.22) is inappropriate in any context, and the further use of such
language is hereby disapproved." Id. at 882.
5. People v. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 222-224 (1856).
6. Id.
7. The court went on to review the current rule that general evidence of reputation was
admissible, while evidence of specific acts was not, and its rationale for overturning that rule:
In this class of cases, when the prosecutrix is the sole witness, and the accused is
compelled to rely upon circumstantial evidence for his defense, any fact tending to the
inference that there was not the utmost reluctance and resistance, is always received.
That there was not an immediate disclosure; that there was no outcry, though aid was at
hand and the prosecutrix knew it; that there was no indication of violence to the person;
that the act was committed at a time, and under circumstances calculated to raise a doubt
as to the employment of force, are put as strong circumstances of defense, not as
conclusive, but as throwing doubt upon the assumption, that there was a real absence of
assent. In 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, section 214, the rule is thus laid down; "The
character of the prosecutrix for chastity may also be impeached, but this may be done by
general evidence of her reputation in that respect, and not by particular instances of her
unchastity; nor can she be interrogated as to criminal connection with any other person
except as to the previous intercourse with the prisoner himself, nor is such evidence of
her previous intercourse admissible . . . . It is contended in this case, that evidence of
90
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address the propriety and necessity of warning the jury of the danger of
convictions based solely on the victim's testimony:
... There is no class of prosecutions attended with so much danger,
or which afford so ample an opportunity for the free play of malice
and private vengeance. In such cases the accused is almost
defenseless, and Courts, in view of the facility with which charges
of this character may be invented and maintained, have been strict
in laying down the rule which should govern the jury in their
finding.
From the days of Lord Hale to the present time, no case has ever
gone to the jury, upon the sole testimony of the prosecutrix,
unsustained by facts and circumstances corroborating it, without the
Court warning them of the danger of a conviction on such
testimony.
The case before us is supported alone by evidence of the
prosecutrix, a young ignorant girl, thirteen years of age, and is so
improbable of itself as to warrant us in the belief that the verdict
was more the result of prejudice or popular excitement, than the
calm and dispassionate conclusion upon the facts by twelve men
sworn to discharge their duty faithfully. In fact, this is evinced by
the Opinion of the Court in passing upon the motion for a new trial,
in which the presiding Judge cannot refrain from the expression of
grave doubts as to the correctness of the verdict; and we are led to
general reputation is admissible, but not of particular acts, and even if the evidence had
been admissible, the questions should have been first up to the prosecutrix. I cannot
understand why, upon any sound rule, general reputation should be preferred to particular
facts. It is true, that it is said the party comes prepared to prove her general character,
and her attention is not directed to the special facts. It appears to me that proof of
particular acts of lewdness should be admitted in preference to general reputation, which
may be good or bad, either deservedly or undeservedly. Facts tend to make up the sum of
reputation, and the cause, and not the result, would be safer testimony to rely on. If these
facts of instances of lewdness are admitted, then I conceive that it is immaterial by whom
they were proved, and that it was not necessary to inquire of the prosecutrix concerning
them. They were not introduced so much for the purpose of impeaching her evidence
directly, as for the purpose of doing away with the presumption that there was a total
absence of assent on her part. But admitting the full force of the rule in Rex v. Hodgson,
still we are of the opinion that the circumstances of this case modify the rule. The
prosecutrix was young and ignorant; had lived on a farm with the accused in the country,
where she had no intercourse with the world; her character was not formed, by reason of
her youth and inexperience, and her proclivities could only be ascertained by reference to
individual instances of lewdness, and that precocious immodesty which sometimes
displays itself in girlhood and marks the character of the woman.
Id. at 222-23 (internal citations omitted).
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the belief, had it not been for some misapprehension of the rule
established by this Court regulating the granting of new trials in the
Court below, the verdict would never have been allowed to stand.
A conviction upon such evidence would be a blot upon the
jurisprudence of the country, and a libel upon jury trials.
It is to be remembered that in earlier days, the fundamentals of due
process, relative to the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, had not yet crystallized into rights.9 The right to testify
under oath and the right to counsel, discovery, and subpoena were not
available to the accused.'o Thus, in a period of history when people believed
in witchcraft and in the use of the chastity belt, such a caution was
warranted, especially when the rapist suffered death by hanging as a result of
his conviction.
On retrial of the Rincon-Pineda case, I refused to so instruct the jury. I
asked that in the event of a conviction, there might be a review of this 300-
year old English sacred cow. For the benefit of the reviewing courts, I made
the following statement:
Yet we, as judges of the criminal court, on the brink of 1974, in
enlightened times, and as ministers in the administration of justice,
are asked to kneel in a blind obedience to this rule, and are
commanded to instruct twelve lay persons that the testimony of
these victims must be examined with a special caution . . . . I find
that the giving of such an instruction in this case is unwarranted
either by law or reason, that it arbitrarily discriminates against
women, denies them equal protection of the law, and assists in the
brutalization of rape victims by providing an unequal balance
between their rights and the rights of the accused in court."
Upon deliberation, the jury convicted the defendant of felony rape.12
had hoped that in the event Rincon-Pineda was convicted that the defendant
would appeal, giving the reviewing courts a chance to make the cautionary
8. Id. at 223-24.
9. See Rincon-Pineda, supra note 3, at 876-79.
10. See id
11. Trial Transcript 397-98, Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Van Nuys, No. A-126773
(1973) (Arabian, J.) (on file with author). See also Rincon-Pineda, supra note 3, at 871-72
("Although the jury was given CALJIC No. 10.06 in modified form, the court refused over defense
objection to give the cautionary instruction, CALJIC No. 10.22. The court acknowledged that the
instruction was mandatory in sex cases, but noted that its compulsory use had not been
authoritatively reexamined for decades.")
12. See Rincon-Pineda, supra note 3, at 870. The public defender sought a new trial on behalf of
defendant, which I declined to grant. He also proposed that since the Mexican national defendant
had no criminal background, he be deported to Mexico to be reunited with his family, in lieu of a
prison term. This I also denied.
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instruction discretionary rather than mandatory. Indeed, the defendant
appealed, and the District Court of Appeal reversed the conviction due to my
failure to so instruct." The prosecutor then filed a Petition for Review with
the California Supreme Court, which was granted, thereby vacating the
reversal. 14
On July 31, 1975, in an incredible event, the justices unanimously
agreed that the court-created mandate to read the cautionary instruction was
indeed a rule without reason.15 They affirmed the conviction, and struck the
cautionary instruction from the law of California in all sex cases.' 6
Chief Justice Donald R. Wright, authoring the opinion, concluded that
the refusal to give the instruction had not prejudiced the defendant.' 7  He
wrote:
Defendant was accorded a full measure of modem due process;
he stood before the jury represented by counsel, clothed in the
presumption of innocence, and shielded by the need for his guilt to
be established beyond reasonable doubt ere he could be convicted.
Conviction necessarily entailed according credence to the victim's
identification, but that identification was premised upon ample
opportunity for perception of the perpetrator of the rape, was
corroborated to some extent. . ., and was free of even a hint of the
taint of racial or sexual prejudice or of a blind urge for retribution."
The court used two approaches in its review of the case. The first was a
historical review of this area of the law, which resulted in finding this form
13. People v. Rincon-Pineda, Crim. No. 25299 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Dec. 1, 1974)
(unpublished) (noting that in reversing the conviction, they did not consider the propriety of the
instruction since it had been a part of the law of California for so long).
14. The Petition for Review was granted on March 10, 1975.
15. See Rincon-Pineda, supra note 3, at 877 (concluding that "[i]n light of ... the evolution of
the cautionary instruction, and with the benefit of contemporary empirical and theoretical analyses of
the prosecution of sex offenses in general and rape in particular, we are of the opinion that the
instruction omitted below has outworn its usefulness and in modem circumstances is no longer to be
given mandatory application.").
16. Id. at 866, 882 ("[H]aving dispensed with the notion that those accused of sex offenses suffer
any special prejudice today, we think the instruction as it has customarily been worded (i.e., CALJIC
No. 10.22) is inappropriate in any context, and the further use of such language is hereby
disapproved.").
17. Id. at 873 ("Under the circumstances here present we cannot say that there is a substantial
probability that a jury which had properly been given the cautionary instruction would have been
any more aware than was the jury which convicted defendant that the key issue in the case was the
credibility of the complaining witness. It follows that the trial court's error was not prejudicial, and
did not result 'in a miscarriage of justice.').
18. Id. at 873.
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of counterbalance no longer necessary.' 9 The other was an evaluation of
empirical studies pointing out the low rate of convictions for rape, which the
court felt undermined any present-day promulgation of the language.20
Their decision was instrumental in the advancement of civil rights, civil
liberties, and of fairness and impartiality in our courts of law.2 1
On August 6, 1975, the Los Angeles Times published an editorial about
the outcome of the case.22 The author called the California Supreme Court's
holding "the next logical step" in changing laws pertaining to rape.23
19. See Rincon-Pineda, supra note 3, at 873-79. The court reviewed the writings of Sir Matthew
Hale, who dealt extensively with rape and the evidence which should be allowed to prove or
disprove the charge. The court quoted Hale's assessment of the problem of false accusations of rape
as follows:
I only mention these instances, that we may be the more cautious upon trials of offenses
of this nature, wherein the court and jury may with so much ease be imposed upon
without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the offense many times transporting
the judge and jury with so much indignation, that they are over hastily carried to the
conviction of the person accused thereof, by the confident testimony sometimes of
malicious and false witnesses.
Id. at 874-75 (citing 1 HALE, HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 636 (1st Am. ed. 1847)). The
court then reviewed the reasoning in Benson, supra note 5, and stated that subsequent to that ruling,
"it became the rule in California that upon request cautionary instructions reflecting the Benson
reading of HALE were to be given in rape cases 'either when the prosecutrix is a child of tender years
or when her testimony is uncorroborated."' Id. at 975 (citing People v. Rangod, 112 Cal. 669, 672
(1896); People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal. App. 280, 298 (1921)). Finally, the court concluded that the
concerns that had lead to this cautionary instruction in sex offenses and rape cases were alleviated by
"changes in criminal procedure wrought in the intervening" years since Hale's writings, as well as
"dramatic differences in the position of the criminally accused in the United States today from one
so accused in 17th century England." Rincon-Pineda, supra note 3, at 877-78. These differences
and changes include the presumption of innocence and fundamental due process rights, including
"the rights of an accused to present witnesses in his defense and to compel their attendance," and the
"right ... to the assistance of counsel ... regardless of his personal means." Id. at 878. Finally, the
court noted that the "justification for the compulsory nature of the instruction is ... that sex offense
cases involve what 'must be conceded [to be] the kind of act [which] is so thoroughly repugnant to
the average person that it can breed that righteous outrage which is the enemy of objective fact
finding. In addition, the shocking nature of the act might well lead a complaining witness to hasty
identification of the alleged perpetrator."' Id. at 879 (quoting People v. Merriam, 66 Cal.2d 390, 395
(1967)).
20. Rincon-Pineda, supra note 3, at 879-882. In this portion of the opinion the court reviewed a
variety of studies, surveys, and other types of empirical evidence tending to strongly refute the
conception "that the accused perpetrators of sex offenses in general and rape in particular are subject
to capricious conviction by inflamed tribunals of justice[.]" Id. at 882 (citing Note, The Rape
Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1378-84 (1972); Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 1973, at 15 (1974); HARRY KALVEN AND HANS
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-80 (Little, Brown & Co. 1966); LeGrand, Rape and Rape Laws:
Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REv. 919, 921 (1973); MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS IN
FORCIBLE RAPE 27-28 (University of Chicago Press 1971)).
21. After reaching its holding, the court took the time to "reaffirm and reinforce the existing
instructions as to the credibility of witnesses which must presently be given." Id at 883. These
instructions, as well as instructions which were later created, do not discriminate against women and
rape victims by applying only to rape cases.
22. The Rape Victim and the Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1975, at A6 (reprinted with permission).
23. Id. The author characterized the "steps" prior to this one as follows:
California law was changed last year to provide that testimony in a rape trial about a
94
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In the past, because of the attitudes of society, the woman rape
victim who reported the assault became almost as much an object of
suspicion as the suspect she named. She was subjected in court to
intensive interrogation about her personal life, and judges were
required to instruct juries that her testimony should be considered
'with caution'. . . . Superior Court Judge Armand Arabian had
refused to issue the old instruction because he considered it
demeaning to the woman. It was demeaning, but, more than that, it
was a denial of equal justice.24
A new instruction was created and now is given sua sponte in every
criminal case where proof of a fact does not depend upon the testimony of a
single witness and corroborating evidence is not required.25 Known as the
Rincon-Pineda instruction, it states:
You should give the [uncorroborated] testimony of a single witness
whatever weight you think it deserves. Testimony concerning any
fact by one witness, which you believe, [whose testimony about that
fact does not require corroboration] is sufficient for the proof of that
fact. You should carefully review all the evidence upon which the
proof of that fact depends.26
Today, defendants throughout the state who are accused of any one-on-
one confrontation-which can range from purse-snatching to the sale of
narcotics to an undercover officer-enjoy the benefit of that instruction.
Emboldened by the court's ruling, several years later I authored and
published an article entitled The Cautionary Instruction in Sex Cases: A
woman's sex life can be introduced only after a special hearing outside the presence of a
jury, and then only if a judge finds it relevant to the woman's credibility as a witness.




25. C.A.L.J.I.C. § 2.27 (known as the "Rincon-Pineda" instruction). In the Rincon-Pineda case,
the court stated that "[i]t has been suggested by amicus curiae for defendant that the potential for an
erroneous verdict of guilt upon the uncorroborated testimony of a complaining witness may be
minimized by our propounding, in lieu of CALJIC No. 10.22, some sort of cautionary instruction to
be given in any prosecution in which the case against the defendant 'substantially rests upon the
testimony of the complaining witness' uncorroborated by 'substantial evidence."' Rincon-Pineda,
14 Cal. 3d, at 883. This instruction met that need.
26. Id.
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Lingering Insult.27 The article provided a survey of each state with regard to
such cautionary instructions, and rang a death knell for their future.28
My refusal to instruct the jury according to California law invited
comment, some intellectual, some unkind. However, years later, Ronald A.
Cass, former dean of Boston University School of Law, analyzed it this way:
Other, less famous decisions make an even stronger case for
seeing judges as "legislators in robes." Consider, for example, a
decision by Judge (later California Supreme Court Justice) Armand
Arabian during the trial of Leonardo Rincon-Pineda on rape
charges. Judge Arabian refused to give a legally required jury
instruction cautioning jurors against accepting the testimony of the
prosecutrix. Judge Arabian decided that, though the law in
California clearly required him to give the requested instruction, the
instruction was morally indefensible. It rested on factual
assumptions that Arabian thought untrue, and it was the residue of
prejudices born of social circumstances long since changed.
Arabian declared that because the required instruction was
judicially mandated-not statutorily required-judges could alter
the rule. The court of appeals said, in effect, "Maybe so, but not a
trial judge." The rule had been confirmed repeatedly by the state
supreme court, and judges of the intermediate appellate court did
not believe that any lower court could change the rule. The
Supreme Court of California (long before Judge Arabian's
elevation) reversed the appellate court along with its own prior
decisions.
Judge Arabian's decision was the product of his own sense of
fairness and justice, not of his construction of external governing
authority. We can speculate about the source of his sense of the
injustice that adhering to the law would have wrought-did it come
from his Armenian heritage (encompassing both personal exposure
to discrimination and familiarity with stories of the "Armenian
genocide" at the turn of the century), from his education or other
sources? Whatever the answer to that question, the answer cannot
be that it came from a simple reading of legal authority. Judge
Arabian saw his role in Rincon-Pineda as helping to correct the
law, not simply to apply it. In his own words:
The legislative process offers an appropriate vehicle for
abolishing the cautionary instruction. An overwhelming
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majority of states have not had legislative involvement on
this issue, however, and the task of educating these
jurisdictions in order to obtain an enlightened response
looms as an immediate stumbling block . ... A viable
alternative to the legislative process is judicial refusal to
give the instruction. By this method, on appeal of a
conviction, the appellate court would be afforded an
opportunity to render a present-day view.
That evinces the same sense of judicial role as the statement by
another thoughtful judge that it is better for the legislature and
agencies to make the law right, "but when they don't, we have to."
Undoubtedly, that statement and Judge Arabian's are not
proclamations that judges are not - or should not be - limited by
external command. Judge Arabian might well have acted
differently if the rule he disputed was legislated or had been
recently adopted by the state supreme court or had been specifically
reconsidered in the recent past. Such comments are, however, at the
least evidence that some judges consciously allow considerations
outside the immediate ambit of external authority to affect some
decisions.29
III. THE SEXUAL ASSAULT COUNSELOR-VICTIM PRIVILEGE
Partly as a result of my efforts in this case, I became in demand as a
speaker, and began appearing regularly before various groups. In 1976, I
traveled to Kansas City, Missouri to attend a National District Attorneys'
Conference to discuss sexual assault. My remarks were entitled, "The
Renaissance of Rape." After my remarks, I was approached by a woman
who was the director of a Rape Crises Center in Pueblo, Colorado. She
related the following story. Two young men were accused of sexually
assaulting two young females. At the Center, she and her assistant each
conferred with an alleged victim and took notes. Thereafter, the defense
counsel filed a motion for discovery seeking the counselor's records
pertaining to the victims' accusations against their clients. The trial court
granted the motion and a subpoena duces tecum was issued.30
29. RONALD A. CASs, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 58-59 (The Johns Hopkins University
Press 2003) (citing Rincon-Pineda, supra note 3).
30. A subpoena duces tecum is "A subpoena ordering the witness to appear and to bring
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The counselors were in a quandary. On the one hand, the crisis center
was funded by a contractual state grant and any disclosure of gathered
information would result in a loss of funds. On the other hand, failure to
respond to the subpoena would land them in hot water. They decided to
appear in court without the subpoenaed documents, believing that because
three psychologists and a psychiatrist sat on the Center's board of directors,
they were acting under the umbrella of a medical privilege. The judge
disagreed and incarcerated them for an indeterminate stay. The counselors
then requested that other members of the center locate the female victims
and obtain their consent. The female victims consented, and the files
containing their statements were surrendered to the judge and given to the
defense. The counselors were upset and did not know how to proceed in the
future. They looked to me for guidance.
I was disturbed by their quandary and returned to California intent on
addressing such a predicament through legislation. I knew its resolution
would pose a tremendous challenge, but began drafting appropriate
language.
On November 8, 1976, I appeared before the California Senate Judiciary
sub-committee on violent crime, chaired by then Senator Alan Robbins (D-
Van Nuys). In 1974, he had created the Robbins Rape Evidence Law which
protects invasion of the alleged victim's background.3 1
At that hearing I introduced a new concept in the jurisprudence of
America and of the world. My proposal was designated the "Sexual Assault
Counselor-Victim Privilege." Intended to be added to the evidence code, the
privilege was designed to protect the privacy of rape victims and counselors
in rape crisis centers. Also, it would grant a protection against disclosure
without the prior express consent of a victim as to any confidential
communication.
I decided to go public. On the morning of February 21, 1977, the Los
Angeles Times published my article entitled Rape Centers Need Rights of
Their Own, which read in part:
"I've been raped! Will you help me?"
"Of course. We're here to do anything we can."
Does that sound like something you saw on television or read in
a novel? No, it's a typical exchange of the sort that takes place
daily across the country between sexual-assault counselors and
women who have been victimized. Rape-crisis centers and their
telephone hotlines are playing an increasing role in the guidance
and referral of women after they have been sexually, physically and
specified documents, records, or things." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed. 2004).
31. CAL. EVID. CODE § 782 (West 2009).
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mentally abused . . . . They refer women to medical, legal and
psychological services, put them in touch with law enforcement
agencies when necessary, sponsor self-defense courses and other
educational programs, and disseminate information. The center,
their counselors and their clients, however, have been operating
under a serious misapprehension. They have assumed that their
activities and records were private: that the relationship between a
rape victim and counselor was included in the same legal privilege
that applies to women consulting with their doctors, lawyers or
ministers. Unfortunately, that confidence is misplaced. There is
nothing to prevent a defense attorney from issuing a subpoena for a
rape center's records or from requiring counselors and other staff
members to testify in court . . .. This is improper. Rape counselors
are supportive personnel whose primary role is to advise the victim.
The idea that they should be subjected to cross-examination while
the defense probes for inconsistencies in the victim's statements, is
repellent. There also is the danger that the atmosphere in rape-crisis
center, instead of being comforting and reassuring, will become
strained as staff members wonder whether their conversations and
records will later become evidence in court . . . . To solve this
problem, I have drafted a new provision to the evidence code, which
has been introduced as Senate Bill 174. Sponsored by State Sen.
George Deukmejian (R-Long Beach), it sets forth a simple addition
to the law, specifying that a sexual-assault counselor and his or her
records are privileged unless the victim expressly consents either to
let the counselor testify or to release the records.32
In 1977, after several drafts of language and the assistance of two state
senators, 3 the bill was introduced into the California state senate. The bill
met with initial resistance, but made steady progress in various forms
through 1977 and 1978.
As time passed, rape reform moved forward. On September 27, 1978,
the Los Angeles Times published my article entitled, Rapists Find the
Judicial Odds Changing.34
32. Armand Arabian, Rape Centers Need Rights of Their Own, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1977
(morning ed.), at 6-Part II.
33. I credit then state senators George Deukmejian and Alan Robbins with providing valuable
counsel and assistance in the drafting and ultimate approval of the legislation.
34. Armand Arabian, Rapists Find the Judicial Odds Changing, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1978
(morning ed.), at 6-Part II:
If you do report it to anyone, it will be embarrassing for you only," said Danny
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Caudillo to his victim, Maria, after he repeatedly and brutally raped her. Unquestionably,
the arrogance of this remark is typical of the state of mind of many rapists who believe
that the odds are low that they will ever be caught-or, if caught, convicted-or, if
convicted, punished in any significant way. But such confidence is no longer justified
now that the Legislature has given California a package of laws that treat rape as the
vicious crime that it is. An attitude of curative action in the area of rape was indicated
early in the 1978 legislative session with the repeal of an archaic requirement that there
be independent proof of physical ability to accomplish rape if the accused is under age
14. The passage of AB 2075 by Assemblyman Daniel E. Boatwright (D-Co:.cord) means
that the victim's testimony alone will legally suffice to sustain a conviction. Sen. Alan
Robbins (D-Van Nuys) presented a package of rape bills that covered areas such as the
privilege of confidence between the victim and the sexual-assault counselor (SB 1713), a
study concerning psychiatric counseling of convicted rapists in state prison (SB 1716),
attendance at the preliminary hearing of supportive person of the victim's choice (SB
1717) and the extension of rape-evidence protections to victims of forcible sodomy and
oral copulation (SB 1718). Sen. H. L. Richardson (R-Arcadia) presented SB 1840, which
attempted, among other things, to lengthen sentences of multiple rapists, and to give law-
enforcement officials better knowledge of the whereabouts of known sex offenders.
Having passed the Senate, these and other bills were heard by the Assembly Criminal
Justice Committee, which has long been considered a graveyard for "law-and-order"
legislation. However, the committee approved Sen. George Deukmejian's (R-Long
Beach) SB 1479, which prohibits the granting of probation or suspension of sentence to
anyone convicted of rape by force or violence-in other words, mandatory sentencing to
state prison. SB 1479 passed through the full Assembly on a 71-0 vote, and rests now on
the desk of Gov. Brown. If signed into law, it will represent a milestone in rape reform,
and may well set a precedent for other states to emulate. A companion bill awaiting
Brown's signature, Deukmejian's SB 1640, covers the neglected areas of "artificial rape,"
such as rape by use of foreign objects. It addresses such crimes the so-called "Born
Innocent" case in which a San Francisco 9 year old was raped by four children using a
beer bottle-an assault similar to one they had seen in a television movie. SB 709,
already signed into law, increases the penalties for rape from three, four or five years to
higher base terms of three, six or eight years. On the other hand, the Assembly Criminal
Justice Committee displayed great callousness in refusing to extend rape-evidence
protections to other categories of sexual assault. If a defendant is charged with rape, the
alleged victim's prior background and social history generally cannot be explored in the
trial. At least 35 states have followed California's lead in this regard. But if the assailant
chooses forms of sexual assault other than conventional rape, the protection does not
apply. Victims do not choose how they are assaulted, and the legislators' refusal to give
them equal protection was inexcusable. Robbins' bills on victim/counselor privilege and
attendance of supportive person at the preliminary hearing met with a similar fate in the
committee. After considerable struggle, Richardson's bill calling for longer sentences
was also defeated. A controversial aspect in the mosaic of rape-law reform developed in
June when the California Supreme Court announced its decision in People v. Daniel
Caudillo. There, in a 5-2 decision, the court refused to interpret the language "great
bodily injury" to include a rape victim's psychological and emotional trauma. In my
view, the position taken by the majority was entirely correct as an interpretation of the
existing law, and Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird has suffered unwarranted attacks for
her unemotional concurring opinion. Before that decision, Assemblyman Eugene T.
Gualco (D-Sacramento) had sponsored a bill to take such mental trauma into account at
the time of sentencing. It called for an additional three years in prison after the base term
was served. That bill also died in the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee. The
Caudillo case has now passed the quill back to the Legislature. The outcry after the
Supreme Court decision indicates that the violence suffered by this category of victim
will no longer go unnoticed or unattended. The problem is a major one. Last year, in
Los Angeles alone, there were 2,360 reported rapes, an increase of 13.3% over the
previous year. But a recent Justice Department report indicates that only one complaint
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After some further political battles, the bill cleared both houses of the
California legislature. On September 17, 1980, Governor Edmund G.
Brown, Jr., signed the bill into law.3 Thus after four years of persistent
effort, California became the first and only state in the nation to provide a
confidential privilege to rape victims communicating with their counselors.
The California statute is contained in sections 1035 through 1036.2 of
the Evidence Code. Somewhere in its legislative drafting, it became
entitled the Sexual Assault Victim-Counselor Privilege, rather than my
proposed Counselor-Victim Privilege. Many other states labeled it
correctly. My efforts to change it met at long last with success in 2006.37
As of the publication of this article, twenty nine states have adopted
whole or some form of similar protection for counselors of rape victims.
They include Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida,
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming." Twenty one states lack coverage
to date, including Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma,
in four results in an arrest, and only one in 60 results in a conviction. Thus, while 56,000
rapes are reported nationally to the police each year, the actual number of victims appears
to be closer to 250,000. Nevertheless, as the trend toward reporting the crime of rape
increase, victims should be heartened by lawmakers' efforts that herald a heightened
awareness of, and realistic response to, the reality of rape. It will always be embarrassing
for the Marias to report their rapes. But, then, the convicted Dannys will be paying a
heavier price. The odds are changing.
Id.
35. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1035-1036.2 (West 2009) ("Sexual Assault Counselor-Victim
Privilege").
3 6. Id.
37. Id. I credit state senator Sheila James Kuehl for her assistance along with the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
38. ALA. R. EVID. 503a; ALASKA. STAT. §§ 09.25.400, 12.45.049, 18.66.200, 18.66.250 (2007);
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1035.8 (West 2009); COL. REV. STAT. §13-90-107(l)(k)(i) (2007); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-146k (2007); D.C. CODE §§ 14-307, 7-1201.01(l l)(e) (2007); FLA. STAT. § 90.5035
(2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 505.5 (2007); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-802.1 (2007); IND. CODE § 35-
37-6-9 (2007); IOWA CODE § 915.20a (2007); KY. R. EVID. 506; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 510; 16
(2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53-a (2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 20j (2007); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.2157(a) (2007); MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-23-301, 46-14-
217 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49-2542 to 49.2549 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-c:1-2
(2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2a:84a-22.15 (West 2007); N.J. R. EVID. 517; N.M. STAT. § 31-25-3 (2007);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4510 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-53.8, 8-53.12; 42 (2007); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 5945.1 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. §78.3(c)(3)-(4) (2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1614
(2007); WASH. REV. CODE. § 70.125.065 (2007); Wis. STAT. § 905.045 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §
1-12-116 (2007).
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Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
Having reviewed the efforts of those jurisdictions which have enacted
this type of protection, I am of the view that the California statutes embody
the model language, and should be followed by other enacting jurisdictions.
Article 8.5 of California's Evidence Code, now known as the Sexual
Assault Counselor-Victim Privilege, contains Evidence Code sections 1035
through 1036.2. The first several sections define the terms "victim," "sexual
assault counselor," and "confidential communication" between the two. 9
The victim holds the privilege with some exceptions, including that if the
victim has a guardian or conservator, that individual holds the privilege.40
The heart of the privilege is found in two sections, which in their entirety
read as follows:
§ 1035.8. Sexual assault counselor privilege
A victim of a sexual assault, whether or not a party, has a
privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from
disclosing, a confidential communication between the victim and a
sexual assault counselor if the privilege is claimed by any of the
following:
(a) The holder of the privilege;
(b) A person who is authorized to claim the privilege by the
holder of the privilege; or
(c) The person who was the sexual assault counselor at the time
of the confidential communication, but that person may not claim
the privilege if there is no holder of the privilege in existence or if
he or she is otherwise instructed by a person authorized to permit
disclosure.4 1
§ 1036. Claim of privilege by sexual assault counselor
The sexual assault counselor who received or made a
communication subject to the privilege under this article shall claim
the privilege if he or she is present when the communication is
sought to be disclosed and is authorized to claim the privilege under
subdivision (c) of Section 1035.8.42
39. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1035 (West 2009) defines the term "victim," CAL. EVID. CODE § 1035.2
(West 2009) defines the term "sexual assault counselor," and CAL. EVID. CODE § 1035.4 (West
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There is no corresponding provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence,
nor is one currently proposed. In addition, to date no federal court has
recognized such a privilege under Federal Rule of Evidence 501.43
However, given the magnitude of the social interest at stake, a party could
reasonably ask a federal court to exercise its common-law power under 501
to create such a privilege.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ignorantia Legis Neminem Excusat." This article is intended to review
the historical path of this privilege, as well as to stimulate those jurisdictions
that have yet to adopt any such privilege into action. It is unconscionable for
the legislatures of the absent jurisdictions to deny their citizens this valuable
protection and procedure.
Tomorrow is two days late for yesterday's job. There can be no excuse
for further delay in implementing national coverage.
43. FED. R. EVID. 501.
44. Ignorance of law excuses no one.
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